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 Analyses the dramatic recent remaking of the UK energy technology innovation system.
 Identiﬁes three distinct phases of innovation dynamics and governance since 2000.
 The private sector has played a leading role in UKs innovation system rebuilding.
 There has been a broad shift from niche to mainstream, continuity-based innovation.
 The UK system suffers from unstable funding, fragmentation and low transparency.
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a b s t r a c t
The UK energy technology innovation system (ETIS) has undergone wholesale remaking in recent years,
in terms of its aims, funding and organisation. We analyse this process and distinguish between three
phases since 2000: new beginnings, momentum building and urgency and review. Within an international
trend to ETIS rebuilding, UK experience has been distinctive: from a low starting base in the early-2000s,
to system remaking under a strong decarbonisation policy imperative in the late-2000s, to multiple and
contested drivers in the early-2010s. Public funding levels have been erratic, with a rapid increase and a
more recent decline. The private business sector has played a leading role in this remaking, and as this
inﬂuence has grown, the role and style of energy innovation has shifted from long term niches to the
shorter term mainstream. The UK ETIS suffers from persistent problems: fragmentation, low transpar-
ency and weak links to the research evidence base.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
One prominent feature of contemporary energy policy and
research is an emphasis on accelerated technological change for
more affordable energy system transition pathways (e.g. Henderson
and Newell, 2011; HMG, 2011; IEA, 2012a). The International Energy
Agency (IEA) has declared that ‘a national strategy … to accelerate
the development and adoption of low carbon technologies is the
single most important step to address the energy innovation
challenge’ (IEA, 2012a, p. 117). A number of scenario studies have
suggested that meeting ambitious energy and climate change policies
can be most affordably realised with signiﬁcantly higher levels of
spending on energy innovation (CCC, 2010a; IEA (International
Energy Agency), 2010a). The UK Energy Research Centre suggested
that a ‘step-change increase’ in UK public spending on energy supply
technology RD&D (Research, Development and Demonstration) was
economically justiﬁed (Winskel et al., 2011, p. 215).
Unsurprisingly then, policymakers in the UK and elsewhere
have recently sought to remake energy technology innovation
systems—systems that were greatly run-down over preceding
decades. The UK0s recent efforts at remaking its energy technology
innovation system (ETIS)—in terms of the main the actors, networks
and institutions involved (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991)— are the
focus for this paper.
There is a large recent body of conceptual and empirical research
on energy technology innovation (e.g. Chiavari and Tam, 2011;
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Wüstenhagen and Wuebker, 2011; Grubler et al., 2012). Many
studies have examined the appropriate mix of support policies
(e.g. Fri, 2003; Stern, 2007; IEA, 2011a, 2011b). Among more
formal innovation systems approaches, framings vary – focussing
on, variously, national, regional or technological scales. Foxon and
Pearson (2008) suggested that innovation systems studies can be
collectively characterised by their systemic, dynamic and non-linear
perspective. Technology-focussed innovation systems analysis has
been a very active area of research over the past decade, with more
recent work tending to adopt an explicitly functionalist analysis of
system performance (e.g. Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Suurs and
Hekkert, 2012). Within this, there have been relatively few studies
of the UK ETIS (e.g. Gross, 2004; Foxon and Pearson, 2008; Watson,
2008; IEA 2012b).
A number of authors have derived ‘best practice’ guidelines for
energy innovation policy from the research literature. Among the
high-level messages here, Chiavari and Tam (2011) and Grubler
et al. (2012) noted the need to position and align innovation policy
within overall energy policy objectives; Grubler et al. also called for
a systematic approach spanning demand-side technologies as well
as supply, and also, sustained support over time rather than ‘stop–
start’ efforts. Winskel et al. (2006) and Foxon and Pearson (2008)
highlighted the need for distinctive policies at different innovation
stages, with design variety support in early-stage innovation and
market creation and domestic industry support in later-stages.
Foxon and Pearson (2008) also noted the need to avoid short-term,
inﬂexible and ‘incumbent-oriented’ policies. Watson (2008) identi-
ﬁed a need for ‘radical system innovations and not just incremental
ones’, and he noted that incumbent companies may not be best
placed to implement radical innovations.
Watson (2008) also considered UK ETIS developments in the
context of Rothwell0s typology of organisational modes of innova-
tion: from the highly linear technology-push mode in the 1950s to
the networked model in the 1990s (Rothwell, 1994). As Winskel
et al. (2006) noted, the networked model of innovation—with its
emphasis on distributed agency and learning, and inter-
organisational networks and feedbacks—has underpinned much
innovation systems research over the past two decades. In UK ETIS
case analysed below, by contrast, more directed, linear and
incumbent-oriented organisational modes of innovation re-
emerged in the late-2000s, reﬂecting urgent pressures for wider
energy system change. The challenge that this (re)linearisation
presents to the networked model still prevalent in much wider
innovation studies is an interesting issue for further research.
At the end of the paper (in Section 6) we reﬂect on the UK
experience of ETIS system remaking in the light of these high-level
best-practice guidelines. However, our main analytical concerns here
are descriptive and interpretive, rather than functionalist or pre-
scriptive. While we discuss some implications for policy and
research, we do not attempt to benchmark UK developments against
an ideal system or optimal set of speciﬁc policies. Like Grubler et al.
(2012), we see much of the value of an ETIS perspective as identifying
patterns and guidelines across different technologies and contexts,
rather than more speciﬁc prescriptions or hypotheses, and we have
avoided a formal, functional analysis. Following Sagar and Holdren
(2002, p. 468), our concern is with ‘a mapping of the relevant
institutions, their energy innovation activities, and the relationships
between them’. However, we also interpret these changes by refer-
ence to the innovation studies literature, in terms of shifting styles of
innovation dynamics and governance.
Innovation systems research spans a broad spectrum of inter-
woven socio-technical practices. While acknowledging this
breadth, our unit of analysis here is the Energy Technology
Innovation System (ETIS), reﬂecting our analytical focus on tech-
nological innovation rather than more ‘purely’ regulatory or
organisational innovation. We conceive of the ETIS as the set of
main actors/organisations, inter-organisational networks and
institutions (including market, regulatory and planning rules,
and also less formal norms and values) concerned with energy
technology innovation. We see the ETIS as being partly-coupled
and partly-aligned with the wider energy system, and while our
focus is on technology innovation, we also discuss the changing
wider energy system and how changing wider system drivers and
responses reshaped the role and make-up of the UK ETIS. The
wider energy system is seen as an important source of pressures
and imperatives on innovation dynamics and governance
Innovation systems are social constructs that reﬂect particular
material, institutional and cultural settings (Hughes, 1983; Anadón,
2012). The rationale and composition of such systems—their aims
and expectations within wider socio-technical change, as well as the
actors, networks and institutions involved—are themselves ﬂuid and
contested. As we discuss in Sections 5 and 6, the remaking of the UK
ETIS over the past decade has involved shifting and contested notions
of the role of technological innovation in wider energy system
change. While the UK is our main focus—reﬂecting our primary
expertise and interests—we also brieﬂy consider wider international
patterns of energy technology innovation, common international
challenges and UK performance in international context.
UK experience of energy innovation system rebuilding has been
a distinctive one, in terms of the very low starting point in the
early-2000s, the rapid pace of change from the mid-2000s, and the
erratic pattern of public spending. For much of the period covered
here, a strong decarbonisation imperative played-out over a highly
liberalised and fragmented institutional context. Over the course
of its remaking, there was a shift from niche to mainstream and
continuity-based innovation, with a leading role for the business
sector and public-private partnerships. However, while it reﬂects a
particular mix of international drivers and local context, the UK0s
experience also exempliﬁes international concerns to reconcile
different energy policy drivers—decarbonisation, affordability, security
and business development—and common challenges, such as creating
co-ordinated, ‘mission-oriented’ innovation systems in privatised
industry sectors and liberal economies.
The case study presented here is based on quantitative analysis of
spending patterns, qualitative analysis of policy and strategy docu-
ments, and our own knowledge and experience of working inside the
UK0s public ETIS over the past 15 years. Our analysis is also informed
by recent research on energy innovation governance. In the next
Section we trace the changing composition of the UK ETIS since
2000, in terms of its resourcing, strategic objectives and organisa-
tional make-up (Section 2); we then consider UK developments in
their wider international context (Section 3) and research debates on
energy innovation governance (Section 4). Section 5 brings these
different elements together to develop a number of discussion points
and lines for further research; Section 6 concludes.
2. Remaking the UK energy technology innovation system
2.1. New Beginnings (2000–2004)
Technological innovation was a marginal pursuit in the UK
energy system of the early-2000s. From the mid-1980s onwards,
market liberalisation and industry privatisation led to a collapse in
RD&D efforts; whilst these forces were felt globally, they were
experienced particularly strongly in the UK (Helm, 2003). The UK0s
privatised energy companies had little strategic interest in tech-
nological innovation and there was very little public or private
investment in energy innovation in the 1990s (Fig. 1; BIS
(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills), 2009). One
material aspect of this was the closure of much of the UK0s public
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research infrastructure, with remaining skills and facilities dis-
persed across a small number of isolated research groups.
A number of high-proﬁle reviews and enquiries in the early-
2000s paved the way for increased innovation efforts (RCEP (Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution), 2000; ERRG (Energy
Research Review Group), 2001; PIU (Performance and Innovation
Unit), 2002), but this turn-around started in a very gradual fashion.
The principal driver for change was an emerging decarbonisation
imperative. The scale of the challenge presented by climate change
for energy systems was highlighted by the Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution (RCEP (Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution), 2000). The RCEP concluded that the
UK should aim to reduce emissions by 60% on 1990 levels by 2050,
implying wholesale changes in the production and use of energy. It
also represented a challenge to the technology-neutral principles
that had dominated UK energy innovation policy for more than a
decade; the RCEP called for stronger market-pull mechanisms for
mature technologies and increased early-stage support for those
emerging technologies most relevant for the UK.
The actual policy response was limited: spending levels increased
only slightly, organisational reforms were modest and there was no
major shift from technology-neutrality toward a priority-based
innovation system. Nevertheless, energy and climate became promi-
nent issues in policy debate, and in 2001 the Government0s Perfor-
mance and Innovation Unit (PIU) undertook the ﬁrst systematic
energy review since privatisation. On innovation strategy, the PIU
was informed by an Energy Research Review Group (ERRG) set up by
the Government0s Chief Scientiﬁc Advisor, a prominent advocate of
greater efforts on energy innovation. The ERRG called for UK public
spending on RD&D to be raised to bring it in line with that of
European competitors (ERRG (Energy Research Review Group), 2001).
The ERRG identiﬁed a set of priority technologies for which
increased funding could have a signiﬁcant impact in the UK—
including carbon capture and storage (CCS), hydrogen, advanced
nuclear, solar PV and marine energy (ERRG (Energy Research
Review Group), 2001). This comprised the ﬁrst technology portfo-
lio for public energy innovation efforts since privatisation,
although budgets remained small and more mature technologies,
such as wind power, were omitted; instead, technology-neutral
market-pull support was to be relied on here.1 The ERRG also
called for greater co-ordination of the UK0s re-emerging
energy research efforts, and the setting-up of a national
energy research centre; the UK Energy Research Centre was duly
established as a wholly publicly funded centre, although with a
smaller budget than recommended, and as a distributed centre
spanning several universities, rather than a single-site national
centre.
The Government soon accepted the RCEP0s recommended 60%
by 2050 target (DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), 2003).
Though this re-established the legitimacy of long-term steerage of
the energy system, it was modest in terms of its political,
economic and institutional impact, at least over political and
corporate planning horizons. The carbon emissions of the UK
electricity system had fallen steadily during the 1990s and early
2000s (DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change), 2010)
and the Royal Commission and PIU both presented scenarios
suggesting that the 60% target could be met largely by a gradual
roll-out of renewable energy and energy efﬁciency measures
(RCEP (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution), 2000;
PIU (Performance and Innovation Unit), 2002). Large-scale tech-
nologies such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage
(CCS) were not seen as central strands of the required response at
this time, at least over the short to medium term.
The small amounts of UK public spending on energy innovation
in the early-2000s came mainly from the UK Research Councils
and central government departments. In a distinctive initiative,
the Carbon Trust was established in 2001 as an arms-length
publicly funded agency. The Trust0s innovation spending equated
to a public venture capital fund, focused on business creation for
early-stage innovations (Kern, 2011, 2012). Indeed, as Scrase and
Watson (2009) noted, the main organisations in the UK ETIS at this
time—the Research Councils, Government departments and the
Carbon Trust—were all oriented toward niche or long-term inno-
vations. Although a UK system was re-emerging, it remained
marginal to the overall dynamics of energy system change.
2.2. Momentum Building (2005–2009)
In the second half of the 2000s the drivers of wider energy
system change gathered force, providing increased momentum for
UK ETIS rebuilding. In a healthy macroeconomic context, there
were few concerns about the affordability of energy, or the cost of
a more interventionist approach. Indeed, high-level policy targets
for change had yet to be translated into interventions of commer-
cial or political consequence, and in the meantime, public spend-
ing on RD&D began to increase more signiﬁcantly (Fig. 2), with a
developing interest in the business opportunities of a more
interventionist policy approach. At the same time, a conﬂuence
of international and domestic forces began to erode the benign
conditions for energy: rapidly growing international carbon emis-
sions and fossil fuel investments, stalled progress in domestic
emissions reductions and an emerging reliance on imported oil
and gas at a time of increasingly volatile international markets
(HCSTC (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee),
2006).
While maintaining the 60% decarbonisation commitment, the
Government now identiﬁed supply security as a key overall policy
driver alongside climate change (DTI, 2007). More important roles
in wider UK energy system development were suggested for fossil
fuels using CCS and new nuclear power stations—implying sub-
stantial private sector investment in generation plant and network
infrastructure. An emerging policy aim was using public invest-
ment to leverage private sector spending, and in a signiﬁcant
departure from technology neutrality principle, the Government
now enabled ‘banding’ of the main renewables deployment
Fig. 1. UK Public Spending on Energy RD&D (1974–2012).
(Source: IEA, 2013c).
1 At the same time as the UK0s ﬁrst tentative steps toward innovation system
building were being made, the main mechanism for renewables market-pull
support was changed from technology-speciﬁc contracts to a technology-neutral
quota system known as the Renewables Obligation (Mitchell and Connor, 2004).
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support mechanism to allow greater support for less mature
technologies (ibid.).
Within the UK ETIS, more signiﬁcant institutional changes were
now made, with a prominent role for the private sector. The
Energy Research Partnership (ERP) was set-up as a public–private
strategy forum; an early ERP report called for clearer strategic vision,
stronger coordination and greater emphasis on techno-
logy demonstration (ERP (Energy Research Partnership), 2007).
In delivering change, there was to be a key role for a new public–
private partnership, the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), which
brought signiﬁcant resources (up to d60 m p.a.) to bridge the gap
between R&D and deployment. The ETI built-up its own analytical
capability to prioritise its investments. Unlike the (wholly publicly
funded) Carbon Trust, this was done largely in conﬁdence to protect
the interests of its private funders.2 The Government deﬁned the
ETI0s remit as not only ‘to accelerate the deployment of new low
carbon energy technologies’ but also, to provide a strategic focus the
wider low carbon innovation system, including ‘direction and pull on
the Research Councils’ Energy Programme’ (DTI, 2007, pp. 224, 225).
In another important development, the UK Government0s
Technology Strategy Board (TSB)—a public body with signiﬁcant
private sector representation—now moved from an advisory role
to become an executive agency with a signiﬁcant budget. The TSB0s
interests in energy system change focus on business development
—its strategic aims are to ‘accelerate economic growth by stimu-
lating and supporting business-led innovation’ (TSB, 2011), or, in
innovation terms, to ‘accelerate the journey from concept to
commercialisation’ (Hannon et al., 2013). Like the ETI, the TSB
developed its own funding criteria, prioritising UK industrial
capability and global market opportunities; the Board0s early
investment priorities included CCS, hydrogen and enhanced oil
recovery (TSB (Technology Strategy Board), 2008).
At the end of 2008 the UK0s decarbonisation ambition entered
into statute in a Climate Change Act. Reﬂecting increasing evi-
dence of the possible impacts of climate change, the Act increased
the UK0s decarbonisation commitment to 80% by 2050, and
broadened the target from CO2 alone to a basket of six greenhouse
gases (HMG, 2008). These revisions implied a signiﬁcantly more
ambitious decarbonisation trajectory—scenarios suggested that
the UK electricity system needed to become almost carbon-free
by 2030 (CCC (Committee on Climate Change), 2008). Soon after,
under a European Renewables Directive (CEC (Commission of the
European Communities), 2009), the UK Government agreed to a
target of 15% of all energy consumed to be produced by renew-
ables by 2020. Scenarios for complying with the Directive sug-
gested that renewables should provide more than 30% of
electricity generated in the UK by 2020 (HMG, 2009b), requiring
a hugely accelerated deployment programme.
The Government set out the proposed means for achieving its
raised policy ambitions in a Low Carbon Transition Plan and
Renewable Energy Strategy (HMG, 2009a, 2009b); both spelled
out the scale and urgency of the technology deployment challenge
over the next decade, especially for onshore and offshore wind.
After 2020, major supply-side contributions were also anticipated
from nuclear power and fossil fuel plant using CCS, and also, an
expanded and ‘smarter’ electricity grid. The Transition Plan out-
lined a number of reforms to energy innovation strategy: setting
key milestones, developing a standard assessment method and
mechanisms for improved coordination. To support this, the
Energy Research Partnership developed a common vision of
technology pathways, timeframes and risks (ERP, 2009) and
related innovation milestones (ERP, 2010). The Government
stressed the business opportunities all this involved, and the
Transition Plan was accompanied by an industrial strategy (HMG,
2009c).
The Carbon Trust now called for a more emphatic move away
from technology neutrality towards a technology-focused innova-
tion strategy, with a consistent and transparent prioritisation
process spanning ‘focussed support’ for near-to-market technolo-
gies and ‘option creation’ for longer term prospects (Carbon Trust,
2009). Though such calls were not new, the Trust0s report included
detailed techno-economic analysis, sowing the seeds for a series
of Technology Innovation Needs Assessments (TINAs) produced
jointly by the UK public sector energy innovation organisations.
Each of the TINAs’ provide assessments of a technology0s potential
role in the UK energy system, its innovation priorities, the
estimated value from cutting costs through innovation, the case
for public sector intervention and export opportunities (LCICG
(Low Carbon Innovation Co-ordination Group), 2013). By the end
of the 2000s, the UK0s efforts on energy innovation were increas-
ingly designed around large-scale technologies and business
growth opportunities.
2.3. Urgency and Review (2010–13)
UK efforts on UK energy innovation in the early-2010s were
played out in a challenging economic and political context, and a
weakening political and policy consensus on energy policy. Dec-
arbonisation and renewables deployment policy commitments
were translated into regulations of real commercial and political
signiﬁcance, but wider economic problems and rising fossil fuel
prices saw the reassertion of more traditional drivers: affordabil-
ity, security of supply, and economic growth. This period also saw
greater examination of the coherence and effectiveness of the UK0s
ETIS, with critical reviews followed by renewed efforts at co-
ordination (CCC; 2010; NAO (National Audit Ofﬁce), 2010; HCCPA
(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts), 2010; RCUK;
2010; IEA, 2012a, b). After a peak in 2010, public spending on
energy RD&D fell back and some organisations now suffered
spending cuts.
Energy innovation strategy was now more closely aligned with
the wider energy policy agenda, and directed to driving down the
costs of the large-scale supply technologies which were seen as
the main contributors to system change. The Government set-up
cost reduction ‘Task Forces’ for offshore wind and carbon capture
and storage, and articulated a well-deﬁned principle mission for
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2 Whilst the ETI0s analysis is shared with central Government departments—
which provide half of its funding—its detailed ﬁndings are not made widely
accessible.
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energy innovation: ‘in the 2020s we will run a technology race …
before then, our aim is to help a range of technologies bring down
their costs so they are ready to compete when the starting gun is
ﬁred’ (HMG, 2011, p. 1).
Changes to UK energy innovation strategy reﬂected wider
efforts by government to enrol innovation as an engine of
economic recovery. An inﬂuential report by the Council for Science
and Technology concluded that innovation investment in the UK
had hitherto lacked ‘clear prioritisation, long-term strategic vision’
(Hauser, 2010, p. 22), leading to the setting-up of a number of
business-focused national Technology and Innovation Centres
(later known as Catapult Centres) for key strategic technologies
such as renewable energy. Responsibility for Catapult Centre
strategy was given to the TSB, and an early priority area for
catapult funding was offshore renewable energy technologies,
publicly funded at d10 m/yr for 5 years.
As well as this more general drive, a number of critical reviews
of the UK ETIS now emerged. The National Audit Ofﬁce highlighted
major weaknesses in UK renewables support: short termism,
multiple delivery bodies each with their own objectives and
methods, and no arrangements to link individual projects to an
overarching plan (NAO (National Audit Ofﬁce), 2010). Damningly,
the NAO concluded that the overall value for money of public
support measures for renewables could not be demonstrated.
A follow-up report by a UK Parliament Committee (HCCPA
(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts), 2010) con-
cluded that renewables support was delivered through a complex
web of organisations, such that the Government lacked a clear
understanding of how much had been spent or what had been
achieved. The Committee called for new innovation metrics and
milestones, regular progress reporting and improved co-
ordination. The Committee on Climate Change also highlighted
inconsistencies between delivery bodies and Government objec-
tives, and called for stronger links between different stages of the
innovation process, improved monitoring frameworks and stron-
ger links to international R&D programmes (CCC, 2010a).
The Research Councils (RCs) now examined the need for a more
strategic approach to the rapidly expanding university energy
research base (Fig. 3). A RC-commissioned review, conducted by
a panel of international experts, though identifying many areas of
excellence, identiﬁed ‘fundamental weaknesses’, including a lack
of a sustained strategy, competition between different funding
bodies, a lack of transparency and ‘poorly executed or non-existent
mechanisms for moving technologies from the research stages to
early demonstration, application and deployment’ (RCUK
(Research Councils UK), 2010a, p. 1). The review concluded that
‘an overarching plan and roadmap … is urgently required’ (ibid.,
p. 43).
The Research Councils’ response was to more clearly set out
their strategic priorities, including reducing energy consumption
and demand, and accelerated deployment of alternative energy
technologies. Some areas were now selected for more support
(energy efﬁciency, energy storage and whole systems research)
and others for reduction (conventional generation and hydrogen).
Demand-side energy research would now occupy a much more
prominent position in the portfolio, and a senior Energy Strategy
Fellow was appointed to help promote greater coherence across
the programme and set out a research roadmap (later ‘prospectus’)
(RCUK, 2012, 2013).
In response to the raft of critical reviews, the Government0s
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) led a review of
low carbon innovation delivery (DECC, 2011a). Co-ordination was
to be strengthened through a relaunched and expanded Low
Carbon Innovation Co-ordination Group (LCICG)—a strategic forum
including the main Government departments and key ‘delivery
bodies’ such as the TSB, ETI and RCs. DECC also committed to
producing a low carbon ‘technology prospectus’ (later a ‘strategy
review’) to show how individual organisational objectives related
to one another, and a ‘toolbox’ of standard appraisal metrics to
evaluate innovation programmes.
Some efforts at organisational consolidation of the UK ETIS
were now made, with a shift from arms-length bodies to direct
Government control, ostensibly in an effort to ensure closer
alignment with policy priorities. DECC ended the Carbon Trust0s
core funding on the grounds of pressure on resources and the
desire for enhanced accountability (DECC, 2011b). The Govern-
ment also abolished the Regional Development Agencies in Eng-
land, with some of their innovation-related responsibilities instead
operated centrally by the Technology Strategy Board.
As the role of some organisations waned, others became more
inﬂuential. The energy industries’ statutory regulator, Ofgem,
which had built-up its own analytical capability (Ofgem (Ofﬁce
of Gas and Electricity Markets), 2010), launched a Low Carbon
Networks Fund (LCNF), to trial ‘smart networks’ technology
(Ofgem, 2010b). The d500 m Fund represented a step-change on
innovation spending by the UK0s electricity and gas network
operators, and a rebalancing of the overall UK energy innovation
landscape towards network infrastructure. Although Ofgem0s role
Fig. 3. Research Councils’ Energy Programme, Annual Expenditure by Research Theme. Note a: the ﬁgure is based on published in-year (unadjusted) data.
(Source: RCUK, 2010a, b).
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is envisaged as focussing on later stage innovation (Fig. 4)
its investments have included earlier stage RD&D, posing new
co-ordination challenges given the large investment sums involved
and the inexperience of many of the bodies involved.
Despite some efforts at greater cohesion, the UK energy
innovation public landscape still spanned several arms-length
agencies and a number of central Government departments
(Fig. 4; Table 1). Each organisation had its own remit and criteria
for investment prioritisation, with overlapping responsibilities and
interests; devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales and the
European Commission had their own arrangements. As the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) remarked ‘the [UK] innovation
system lacks clarity and connectivity, with a number of different
institutions appearing to cover similar stages’ (IEA, 2012a, p. 118).
Another report by the IEA, while praising the UK0s increased
investment and high-level decarbonisation policies, argued that
spending levels still did not match policy ambitions, and noted the
‘considerable challenge’ of distilling multiple initiatives into a
comprehensive strategy. Echoing earlier criticisms, the IEA con-
cluded that ‘it is not always clear what speciﬁc objectives are being
pursued … or how effectively the public monies are spent’ (IEA,
2012b, p. 160).
The Research Councils0 energy strategy fellowship team highlighted
the dissonances between different bodies operating at different stages
of the UK energy innovation landscape (Fig. 4), in terms of their
different timescales, work methods, metrics and incentives (Hannon
et al., 2013). The fellowship team noted the rival efforts of different
Research Councils, and the ‘major gap’ between academic research
and its commercialisation, with a need for integrated planning
methods between business-based and university-based research.
Fig. 4. UK Energy Public Innovation Landscape.
(Source: adapted from DECC, 2012a).
Table 1
Main UK public energy innovation organisations.
(Source: compiled by authors from multiple sources).
Organisation Stated mission/role Priority technology areas (2012) Nature and scale of innovation
funding
Research
Councils0
Energy
Programme
(RCEP)
To position the UK to meet its policy targets and goals
through high quality research and postgraduate
training.
‘Growing’ research areas include energy efﬁciency,
energy storage, whole systems.
Research grants to UK universities,
and eligible research institutions.
d110 m p.a. (2011–12)
Technology
Strategy
Board (TSB)
To stimulate technology-enabled innovation in the
areas which offer the greatest scope for UK growth and
productivity.
Fuel cells & hydrogen; offshore renewables; grid & digital
energy; built environment: low impact buildings;
transport; materials
Funding for RD&D projects, to
multiple partners, up to d35 m p.a.
(2012–13)
Energy
Technolo-
gies
Institute
(ETI)
To accelerate the development, demonstration and
deployment of a focused portfolio of energy
technologies
Offshore renewables; distributed energy; buildings;
energy storage and distribution; smart systems and heat;
CCS, transport; bio-energy.
ETI receives d60 m p.a. (2008–18)
from public and private source for
project funding.
Department
of Energy
and Climate
Change
(DECC)
To bridge the lengthy gap between a technology being
ready and it being widely deployed: the ‘valley of
death’.
CCS; buildings, offshore renewables; manufacturing d50 m p.a. from 2011 (d180 m
already allocated to priority areas).
Carbon Trust To tackle climate change by creating a vibrant low
carbon economy that delivers jobs and wealth.
Offshore renewables, biofuels and fuel cells. d10 m p.a. (2010–13) from DECC;
support for low carbon
entrepreneurs
Ofgem0s Low
Carbon
Networks
Fund
(LCNF)
To help distribution network operators (DNOs) provide
security of supply at value for money as GB moves to a
low carbon economy.
Focussed on electricity distribution networks Project funding through annual
competitions up to d100 m p.a.
(2010–2015)
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There remained a lack of a long term vision to tie together the UK0s
energy innovation efforts.3
In its ‘research prospectus’ report, the strategy fellowship team
noted that all of the major organisations in the UK energy
innovation landscape —including the Research Councils, ETI and
TSB—adopted a linear view of energy innovation, manifested through
the ‘ubiquitous and somewhat casual’ use of the ‘Technology Readi-
ness Levels’ (TRLs) framework (RCUK, 2013, p. 8). The TRL framework,
ﬁrst developed for US military and space programmes, maps techno-
logical innovations on a nine-point scale ranging from basic research
to pre-commercial deployment. It has been widely adopted by the
UK0s public sector energy innovation organisations over the past
decade, including DECC and the LCICG. At the highest level, it is used
to indicate the respective remits of the main organisations in the UK
energy innovation landscape (see, for example, Fig. 4).
Fig. 5 traces the changing pattern of energy innovation spending
across the main UK public bodies since 2000. Across a changing
landscape of multiple organisations and spending programmes,
Fig. 4 highlights an overall trend to increased overall spending,
but with reduced spend after 2010. Alongside the sustained growth
of university-based research through the Research Councils, Fig. 5
suggests an emerging emphasis on applied innovation for deploy-
ment support, through the spending programmes of business-
oriented or public-private organisations such as the ETI, TSB and
Ofgem. More recently this trend has been countered by the loss of
funding for the Carbon Trust, leading to a rebalancing of overall
effort toward the Research Councils.
In late-2013 the National Audit Ofﬁce issued an update of its 2010
report, ahead of a parliamentary enquiry on the UK ETIS (NAO, 2013).
The report identiﬁed some improvements since 2010, with greater
co-ordination of technology-speciﬁc investments and an improved
evidence base, with the publication of the Technology Innovation
Needs Assessments. At the same time, the NAO found familiar and
persistent problems: a lack of overall strategy and shared scenarios,
with poor comparability across different technology areas and short-
term funding for almost all of the bodies involved. The NAO also
conﬁrmed the dramatic decline in total public spending since a 2010
high point –with a one-third reduction in total public spend between
2010–11 and 2011–12 alone.4 Overall, the NAO concluded that it was
‘not yet clear’ whether the LCICG0s efforts at improved co-ordination
had resulted in improved support.
3. International context5
3.1. International trends in energy innovation
The UK0s dramatic decline in energy innovation spending in the
1980s and 1990s was an extreme case of a wider international
trend (Fig. 6; Sagar and Holdren, 2002; Fri, 2003). The need for
expanded levels of effort on energy innovation was recognised
internationally during the course of the 2000s, and by the start of
the 2010s, public spending had reached levels around those seen
thirty years earlier (Fig. 6). After a sharp peak in 2009 due to
economic recovery programmes, particularly in the US, spending
fell back, although still on a rising trend.
National drivers for this resurgence varied greatly, including
climate change, energy independence and industrial and economic
development. Responses also differed greatly, in terms of institu-
tional and organisational frameworks and the roles of public and
private sectors. In the US, for example, public researchers had a
leading role in strategy formation (Anadón, 2012). As in the UK,
the make-up of international R&D effort has changed signiﬁcantly:
nuclear power claimed only around one third of total spend in
2010 compared to almost three-quarters in 1975, while renew-
ables and efﬁciency spending both grew considerably.
A striking feature of changing spending patterns has been the
increasing importance of the Asia-Paciﬁc region since the mid-1990s,
with a corresponding fall in the European share (Fig. 7).6 Within the
OECD, North America accounted for a surge in expenditure since 2008,
but otherwise its share has been stable. Fig. 7 separates the UK from
the rest of Europe; the UK accounted for as much as 10% of the total
Fig. 5. Reported Spend of Main UK Public Energy Innovation Organisations, 2000–
2011. Table Notes: ((a) ‘HMG’ (Her Majesty0s Government) represents total direct
UK central government spend across multiple government departments. (b) Fig. 5
is based on published in-year (unadjusted) data; Table 1 is based on estimated/
projected annual spending; corresponding data in Fig. 5 and Table 1 may not
match).
Source: Compiled by authors from multiple sources include the annual reports and
accounts from multiple government departments, Ofgem, and the Carbon Trust;
TSB data are taken from the TSB0s database at www.innovateuk.org/public-data;
data for the Research Councils and ETI are taken from the UKERC Research Register
database, at http://ukerc.rl.ac.uk/. Data last updated on 28-05-13.
Fig. 6. Energy RD&D public spending in IEA-OECD member countries by technology.
(Source: IEA, 2013c).
3 LCICG0s review of UK energy innovation strategy is expected to be published
in early-2014.
4 Published evidence on the source of this dramatic decline has yet to emerge,
but it appears to reﬂect inﬂated levels of capital spending in 2010–11, the removal
of the Carbon Trust0s core grant after 2011, and the abolition of the Regional
Development Agencies.
5 Only a brief review is possible here, and rather than a comprehensive
analysis, our aim is to provide context for the UK case; for more detailed reviews,
see Chiavari and Tam (2011), Grubler et al. (2012) and IEA (2012a).
6 Because these ﬁgures exclude non-OECD countries such as China, this shift is
more pronounced than the ﬁgures show; Grubler et al. (2012) suggested that by the
early-2010s the major developing economies were outspending public sector R&D
spend among OECD states.
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OECD effort in 1975 but this fell to as low as 0.6% (and only 2% of the
European total) in the early 2000s. The UK0s recent surge in spending
brought it back up to around 5% of the IEA share in 2010—the median
level on a spend/GDP basis, but this fell away againwith the UK0s more
recent decline in spending (IEA, 2012b). While the whole of OECD-
Europe has had an expanding public innovation base since 2000,
the UK change has been a particularly dramatic case of ‘stop–start’
funding.
3.2. Common challenges
Policymakers face a number of challenges in developing energy
technology innovation systems: aligning investment with overall
energy policy priorities, striking a balance between basic and
applied research, and avoiding fragmentation and duplication of
effort. The IEA noted that global investment in RD&D needed to be
raised by around 25% by 2020 if policy goals were to be met;
beyond 2030, investment would need to be raised by around 50%
(IEA, 2012a). Analytical support for budget allocations and the
appropriate balance between basic and applied research, though
growing, is still limited and the appropriate balance between basic
and applied research is difﬁcult to determine (IEA, 2011a). Grubler
et al. (2012) highlighted data and information gaps in private
sector spending, non-OECD investment, technology spillovers and
transfers, and end-use investments.
Budget-setting for more basic energy research remains more of
an art than science. The relevant scientists may not regard
themselves as energy researchers, and their work may ﬁnd
ultimate application in other ﬁelds. For more applied R&D a
stronger analytical case for budget-setting may be possible. One
approach is to construct energy system scenarios for emerging
technologies, such as advanced PV. This provides an approximate
insight into the economic beneﬁts that innovation could bring, and
a level of funding that might be thought justiﬁed. For example,
Winskel et al. (2011) concluded that the beneﬁts of accelerating a
range of energy technologies in the UK could yield annualised
beneﬁts of around d1 bn from 2010 to 2050, roughly twice the
actual low carbon innovation spend in 2010 (CCC, 2010).
Another approach to priority-setting is to link spending allocations
to declared national technology policy priorities. For countries with
well-recognised natural resource endowments or competences (e.g.
Brazil/bioenergy; Norway/oil and gas; France/nuclear), the correlations
may already be high. For other countries they may be much lower; the
IEA placed the UK bottom of a table ranking OECD countries by the
proportion of total energy RD&D budgets directed to areas of leading
national capability, with only 20% of UK spending directed to
technologies where the UK has a leading edge capability (IEA, 2011b).
The problem of duplication and fragmentation of effort is a risk
in any country with multiple agencies. One report found that US
federal government renewable energy initiatives spanned 23
agencies, 130 sub-agencies and 700 different initiatives (GAO
(U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce), 2012). The scope for
duplication under such circumstances is unlikely to be in the best
public interest. One way to instil greater coherence is to compare
the effectiveness of national programmes, and identify synergies
between national spending priorities.
3.3. UK international participation
International collaboration on energy innovation promises to
reduce the costs of achieving domestic policy targets and help
develop export markets. The IEA (2012b, p. 161) noted that for the
UK, ‘international collaboration… may be essential to accelerate
technology development’. In the European Union there have been
recent efforts to improve the coherence of research. Spending in
the European Commission0s ‘‘Horizon 2020’ programme is
embedded in the Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan),
which elaborates a long-term vision of energy system develop-
ment. This includes Industrial Initiatives and a European Energy
Research Alliance (EERA), comprising 15 leading energy research
institutes (UK partner involvement is through the UK Energy
Research Centre) to better align national and European sources
of funding.
The IEA has also built up a signiﬁcant range of activities in
energy innovation in recent years, through its Implementing
Agreements (IAs), and through these, the IEA has become an
important forum for co-operation between developed and devel-
oping countries (IEA (International Energy Agency), 2010b). The
IEA has also become an important analytical source, carrying out
in-depth national and international surveys of energy innovation
efforts and cross-national studies of good practice (e.g. IEA 2011b,
2012a). The UN has also supported a number of initiatives, such as
the Clean Energy Ministerial and the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA) (ERP, 2012). More bespoke international
collaborations have also emerged in response to speciﬁc chal-
lenges, such as the International Partnership for Hydrogen and
Fuel Cells in the Economy, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum and the Generation IV International Forum for nuclear
ﬁssion.
Evidence on the effectiveness of UK engagement in interna-
tional initiatives is mixed. The UK participates in 25 of the IEA0s
Implementing Agreements, well above the average (ERP, 2012).
Within the EU ‘Framework 7’ Energy Programme (2007–13), UK
universities and research organisations have out-performed the
European average in attracting support, although the reverse is
true for private companies, and for low carbon research (CCC,
2010b). The UK is also perceived as less effective as other states at
inﬂuencing the design of the Framework Programme for low-
carbon technologies (ibid.).
As more consolidated international energy innovation pro-
grammes have emerged, the UK0s system of distributed centres
and has created barriers to participation (ERP, 2012). UK participa-
tion in international programmes has been mostly on a bottom-up
basis led by individual institutions—often competing—with little
overall co-ordination, and the ERP identiﬁed a need for stronger
linkages between the UK0s domestic energy innovation strategy
and international engagement (ibid.). The Research Councils’
energy review also detected missed opportunities for international
collaboration, due to lack of guidelines or incentives (particularly
for collaboration outside of the European Union), lack of funding
and low awareness or time availability on the part of researchers
(RCUK, 2010).
Fig. 7. Proportion of OECD RD&D spend by region.
(Source: IEA, 2013c).
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4. Energy innovation governance
This section steps back from the detailed design of innovation
policies, programmes and institutions, to consider a broader issue:
the governance of an ETIS, in terms of the policies, organisations,
networks and institutions that together form an innovation ‘style’
(Hughes, 1983). We draw here on recent contributions to the
innovation studies research literature. Energy innovation is now a
mainstream subject among innovation studies researchers, with a
burgeoning number of comparative case studies and ‘best practice’
prescriptions (e.g. Weiss and Bonviliian, 2009; Anadón et al., 2010;
Chiavari and Tam, 2011; Henderson and Newell, 2011; Grubler
et al., 2012; Anadón, 2012).
While there is broad agreement in this research community on
the scale and urgency of the energy innovation challenge, con-
tributors interpret the governance implications of this challenge
differently. Many different terms and typologies have been intro-
duced, but to help frame discussion, a distinction is drawn here
between contributions advocating three innovation governance
styles: (i) niche: having an emphasis on relatively decentralised,
emergent and bottom-up dynamics; (ii) mainstream: having an
emphasis on continuity-based and relatively incremental
dynamics; and (iii) breakthrough: having an emphasis on top-
down and centrally planned dynamics.
The breakthrough style of innovation is often seen as having a
history of underachievement in the energy sector, and many
contributors consider that it remains ill-suited and inappropriate
(e.g. Yang and Oppenheimer, 2007; Mowery et al., 2010; AEIC
(American Energy Innovation Council), 2011; Nelson, 2011; Lester
and Hart, 2012; Foray et al., 2012). Beyond that, however, con-
tributors differ in their objections—and their preferred alterna-
tives. For Mowery et al. (2010), the highly diverse character of
energy systems required a decentralised and diverse approach to
energy innovation, with long periods of niche-based learning;
they concluded that it was ‘difﬁcult if not impossible to plan or
predict the structure of the overall R&D effort in any detail’ (ibid.,
p. 1020).
Others have cautioned against an emphasis on niche-led
disruptive approaches. For Unruh (2002) and Unruh and Carrillo-
Hermosilla (2006), the urgency of wider energy challenges
requires a focus on mainstream, continuity-led innovation
approaches in the short to medium term. Similarly, Hargadon
(2010 p. 1026) called for a focus on bottlenecks affecting existing
technologies to ‘enable rapid scaling and broad adoption’. Though
advocating a continuity-led response, Hargadon cautioned against
centrally-planned breakthrough efforts, and he highlighted the
historic failings of US efforts energy innovation breakthroughs.
Lester and Hart (2012, p. 46) argued that the lead times and lock-
ins of energy systems implied focussing on more mainstream,
continuity approaches. Reviewing US federal government energy
innovation efforts, Newell (2011) highlighted the achievements of
incremental efforts in areas such as resource extraction and
processing, industrial process efﬁciencies and nuclear power
capacity factors. By contrast, breakthrough efforts, such as on
synthetic fuels, tended to have much less impact.
Few academic contributors have advocated a breakthrough style.
In one such contribution, however, Perrow (2010) suggested that
while decentralised, bottom-up approaches to innovation governance
were appropriate for parts of the energy system (such as energy
efﬁciency) a centralised top-down approach was appropriate for
large-scale generation technologies such as carbon capture and
storage (CCS). Though commanding few advocates in the academic
research literature, breakthrough approaches have been prominently
referenced by politicians (e.g. US White House, 2011). As Anadón
(2012) noted, these references have gone beyond rhetoric: recent US
energy innovation initiatives, such as ARPA-E and energy innovation
hubs, have been designed with explicit reference to the Manhattan
Programme.
5. Discussion: remaking the role of energy innovation in the UK
The UK represents a dramatic example of ETIS remaking. In
2013 much of its organisational and institutional make-up was
entirely absent a decade earlier. Looking across speciﬁc institu-
tional and regulatory developments, and drawing on the innova-
tion studies literature reviewed in Section 4, it becomes possible to
interpret the changing pattern of pressures and responses in terms
of different energy innovation governance styles. From this per-
spective, we can deduce a shift from niche-based to a mainstream,
continuity-based innovation in the UK (Table 2).
Embedded UK commitments to market liberalism and technol-
ogy neutrality, reﬂected in low levels of energy innovation public
investment, planning and co-ordination, persisted into the 2000s,
well after the re-emergence of overall energy policy ambitions for
change. The need for increased spending and for greater co-
ordination was recognised from the outset, but the re-building
of the UK system, supported by almost wholly public funds at this
stage, was hesitant and at ﬁrst modest. The risks of fragmentation
were acknowledged, but successive governments proved reluctant
or unable to undertake wholesale reforms, so that new initiatives
were added onto existing measures in layers of increasing com-
plexity, channelled through multiple government departments,
organisations and programmes.
Table 2
Phases of UK ETIS development (2000–2013).
Period Economic and political context Policy and institutional developments Innovation dynamics, style and governance
2000–2004
New Beginnings
(innovation as a
niche activity)
Benign context. Decarbonisation driver
emerges, but overall system still driven
by market efﬁciency.
Small but growing innovation spending. Mostly
public sector led innovation initiatives. Technology-
neutral regulation.
Mostly niche-based. Marginal role of innovation in
overall system change, emphasis on long-term
transition. Mostly weak and distributed
institutions.
2005–2009
Momentum
Building
(innovation
becomes a
mainstream
concern)
Supportive economic and political
context. Decarbonisation-driven
change, but growing security and
business creation concerns.
Decarbonisation targets entered into statute.
Growing RD&D spending, new institutions, with
emphasis on public–private partnerships. Shift
toward technology-speciﬁc regulation.
Shift from niche- to continuity-based More central
role of innovation in energy system change in
short/medium term. Leading role for private
sector in remade public innovation strategy.
2010–2013
Urgency and
Review (contested
innovation
missions)
Broad focus on debt recovery and
growth. Reduced energy policy
consensus, with cost of energy
concerns becoming dominant.
Policy targets translated into large spending
commitments, yet declining RD&D spend after 2010.
Criticisms of incoherence, with some efforts at
improved co-ordination.
Mostly continuity-based. Emphasis on cost
reduction and deployment to meet short term
policy targets, but growing dispute over wider
energy system change and the role of innovation.
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In the mid-2000s, in a healthy macroeconomic context, any
tensions between sustainability, affordability and security drivers were
dormant. Indeed, there was a strong apparent synergy between public
(decarbonisation) and private (business development) agendas in the
‘momentum building’ period, and ETIS rebuilding involved increas-
ingly close public-private relations. Growing overall spending on
energy innovation in this period avoided any tensions between longer
term and shorter term goals, but much of the new spending was
directed toward short-term deployment support and cost reduction: a
mainstream, continuity-led approach. Themain organisations involved
now took a relatively linear view of innovation (RCUK, 2013), and this
period saw a shift away from the niche, small ﬁrm and network-based
model seen in the UK energy system in the early-2000s,
and which became prevalent in innovation studies in the 1990s.
The re-linearisation of the UK ETIS in the course of its remaking, under
pressures for accelerated innovation and urgent wider energy system
change, presents an interesting challenge the network model of
innovation.
The early 2010s saw intensiﬁed efforts on energy innovation,
but also a breakdown of economic and political context. The scale
and urgency of the wider energy system challenge became clearer,
as policy targets were translated into spending programmes and
regulatory reforms of real consequence, but this coincided with a
deterioration in the overall economy, sowing the seeds for reduced
political consensus and a weaker alignment of public-private
interests. Public spending was uneven: at ﬁrst increasing steeply
and then falling back sharply, contributing to a turbulent setting
for knowledge creation and use.
International differences highlight the importance of political
context and institutional history to innovation system design. The
UK experience has been a distinctive one: starting from a very low
institutional base ‘hollowed out’ by a long period of market
liberalism, followed by a period of rapid remaking. Business
interests played a central role in this process, reﬂecting the relative
weakness of the UK public sector, including central government
(Kern, 2011). ETIS rebuilding in the UK faced few institutional lock-
ins, allowing responsiveness to emerging priorities such as
demand-side efﬁciencies and more mature demonstration stage
technologies (Anadón, 2012).
At the same time, a business-led innovation strategy raises
some concerns. Incumbent-oriented public-private consortia may
focus on near term existing technologies rather than system-
transforming innovations (Watson, 2008; Foray et al., 2012).
Indeed, the rising inﬂuence of business in UK energy innovation
strategy has coincided with a shift toward more continuity-based
innovation. This said, private capital is likely to have a key role in
energy system transformation in many countries, and there is
some evidence that under the right circumstances, incumbents
can be highly dynamic agents of change (e.g. Bergek et al., 2013).
Another concern with business-leadership is reduced transpar-
ency in the investment decision-making processes. Private inter-
ests will naturally seek to protect their intellectual property and
‘know-how’, but this should not preclude a level of accountable
governance and evidence sharing.
In the early 2010s the UK0s fragmented ETIS attracted many
critical reviews, leading to efforts at greater cohesion; these efforts
are not the ﬁrst of their kind and it remains to be seen how effective
they will prove to be. As overall spending reduced, some arms-length
bodies faced cutbacks, with their responsibilities partly absorbed into
central government. This presents the risk of political interference,
especially at a time of spending pressures and reduced political
consensus. A decentralised innovation system is not necessarily
dysfunctional, if well co-ordinated. Foray et al. (2012) called for a
balance between central control and decentralised agency, with
broad priority-setting, co-ordination and progress assessment done
centrally, but with an essentially decentralised research programme.
The relative merits of centralised versus distributed organisational
modes for ETISs is a key research issue.
Reduced political consensus on wider UK energy policy in the
early-2010s reﬂected more austere economic times, and particular
concerns on the part of some analysts and politicians about the
affordability and desirability of UK energy system transition as set
out in the Climate Change Act (HMG, 2008), Low Carbon Transition
Plan (HMG, 2009a) and Carbon Plan (HMG, 2011). Opposition to
the UK Government0s low carbon policies is based on a mixture of
arguments: climate scepticism from a small but vocal minority
(e.g. Lawson, 2008); concerns about the affordability of support for
low carbon technologies and a related belief that natural gas
(possibly including shale gas) could offer a cheaper ‘lower carbon’
alternative to renewables in the medium-term (e.g. Lewis, 2011;
Helm, 2012; Less and Newey, 2012). By the end of 2012, uncer-
tainties about the role of gas in UK energy futures were evident
within government (DECC, 2012b).
While it has yet to manifest as any major policy revisions, this
political dissensus carries implications for UK energy innovation
strategy, and may provoke a new style of UK ETIS governance. For
example, Moselle and Moore (2011) called for greater emphasis on
long term R&D and learning-by-research for globally-relevant
technologies such as CCS and PV, and reduced focus on learning-
by-deployment and more domestically-oriented priorities such as
offshore wind; this has echoes of the niche-based, less directed
style seen in the UK in the early-2000s. Already, reduced overall
funding has meant greater reliance on the earlier stage innovation
efforts of the Research Councils in the UK0s energy innovation
landscape (NAO, 2013). The counter-argument here is that without
sufﬁciently strong learning-by-deployment support mechanisms,
a learning-by-research approach will fail to deliver technology cost
reductions and wider system impact (e.g. AEIC (American Energy
Innovation Council), 2011; Gross et al., 2012). This debate exposes
important differences of view on the role of technological innova-
tion in energy system change.
6. Conclusions
Faced with the global challenge of energy system change—and
the role, within this, of energy technology innovation—national
responses reﬂect particular drivers, resources and contexts. There
can be no universal blueprint for energy technology innovation
system governance, and more prescriptive efforts to identify
optimal arrangements are likely to be frustrated; they may also
be misplaced: the IEA (2011b, p. 18) noted, conﬁdence in an overall
policy support package for technology development and deploy-
ment matters more than the choice between speciﬁc instruments.
Nevertheless, there is now a substantial ‘what works’ research
base on energy innovation, and the high-level guidelines here
include: a coherent system-wide perspective, sustained funding
over time, avoiding public policy ‘capture’ by incumbent interests,
and supporting a combination of incremental and discontinuous
innovations.
Judged against these high-level guidelines, UK energy technol-
ogy innovation system rebuilding —though impressive in the
speed and scale of its transformation—has fallen short in a number
of ways. The UK system has been remade in piecemeal fashion,
often only weakly coupled to overall policy ambitions; public
spending levels have been erratic, organisational fragmentation
persists, and the interweaving of public and private interests has at
times lacked transparency and accountability. As technology
innovation became more tightly coupled to short-term policy
ambitions, its role in wider system change was redeﬁned away
from long-term niches to the shorter-term mainstream. Though
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reﬂecting international drivers and challenges, UK experience has
been deeply shaped by local traditions, interests and exigencies.
Tensions and pressures in the UK energy system have recently
intensiﬁed, with the prospect of another recasting of the role of
innovation in wider system change. Even more than in the benign
times that formed the backdrop for much of the rebuilding process
reviewed here, this invites research on innovation design and
governance. There is a growing international energy innovation
research base on national responses to global pressures – yet in
the UK, policy-research links remain underdeveloped in this area.
Given the uncertain and contested role of technological innovation
in the wider energy transition challenge, the need is for stronger
references to the evidence base, and more transparent analysis of
the choices and trade-offs involved.
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